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Abstract
We study the problem of risk sharing within a household or syndi-
cate. A household shares risky prospects using a social welfare func-
tion. We characterize the social welfare functions such that the house-
hold is collectively less risk averse than each member, and satisfies the
Pareto principle and an independence axiom. We single out the sum
of certainty equivalents as the unique member of this family which is
quasiconcave over riskless allocations.
1 Introduction
This paper is devoted to the sum of individual certainty equivalents, a com-
mon method if aggregating individual preferences into collective welfare in
an environment of idiosyncratic risk. Each agent in a household1 faces risk
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1We use “household” throughout to refer generically to a group of agents engaged in
an risk sharing arrangement. Wilson (1968) uses the term “syndicate.”
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over her individual monetary consumption. The sum of individual certainty
equivalents for a given allocation of risky prospects is the sure amount that
the household would need to be paid in order to give up the allocation (with-
out first reallocating).
We show that the sum of individual certainty equivalents possesses a
property singling it out from other methods of aggregating welfare. That is,
with this rule, a household of risk averse individuals will behave in the aggre-
gate in a fashion that is less risk averse than each member of the household.
The notion that a group is, or should be, less risk averse than its members
is a very familiar one in economics. Early arguments for the notion are in
Samuelson (1964), Vickrey (1964) and Arrow and Lind (1970).
The environment is simple. Each member of a household faces risky
consumption of a single good, say money. Members of the household have
differing attitudes toward risk. Given an aggregate risk, the household seeks
to allocate the risk to its members to maximize some notion of social welfare.
Our main result can be roughly stated as follows: Suppose that the house-
hold ranks allocations using a social welfare function 0(R), which depends
on individual preferences R = (Ri)i∈N . The sum of individual certainty
equivalents represents the only social welfare function (SWF) that
1. generates households less risk averse than its members (for all individ-
ual preference profiles);
2. ignores risk preferences whenever it compares riskless allocations;
3. is quasiconcave over riskless allocations.
This result is a simple consequence of a theorem stating that (1) and (2)
are equivalent to ranking allocations with a function which takes as input
certainty equivalents, and when maximized over a simplex, has a solution
at every corner. In particular, in any such social welfare function, a riskless
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amount should always all be given to one member of the household–but
which member does not matter. This theorem, in turn, uses some classical
results on aggregation from demand theory (concretely Samuelson (1956) and
Chipman and Moore (1979)).
The sum of certainty equivalents has a simple economic interpretation:
it is the certain monetary sum that the household would demand for an
allocation of risky prospects. In other words, it is the collective willingness to
accept for an allocation. Myerson (2004), for example, recommends MBAs
and applied decision makers use the sum of certainty equivalents to share
risk. The recommendation is based on the idea of maximizing the collective
willingness to accept for an allocation. Our paper provides a completely
different justification for this recommendation.
Other rules are commonly used in welfare analysis; arguably on the
grounds that they are more tractable. We show that, in fact, the sum of
individual certainty equivalents yields very tractable results. In the special-
ized setting of convex homothetic preference profiles (such as CRRA pref-
erences), it yields the most risk averse convex household preference, among
those which are less risk averse than members’ preferences. This result lends
itself to a simple representation using basic convex duality.
We proceed to discuss our results in more detail.
We suppose a finite set of states of the world. A prior distribution over
these states is exogenously specified. Agents’ preferences are over state-
contingent monetary payoffs, which we call acts. We impose little structure
on the preferences of agents other than monotonicity and a weak notion of
risk aversion; in particular, agents need not be expected utility maximizers.
A SWF recommends a preference over allocations for any given list of
individual preferences. We impose the Pareto principle: the SWF must be
increasing in the welfare of individuals.
We present two new axioms. The first axiom is an independence axiom:
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individuals’ risk preferences should not matter for comparing two riskless
allocations; an allocation is riskless when each agent is allocated a constant
act–an act whose payoff does not depend on the state. In comparing two
riskless allocation, one must trade off more money for some individuals and
less for others. Note that individual preferences do not differ over riskless
allocations, they are monotonic. The axiom states that the tradeoffs should
be resolved without regard for the agents’ risk preferences. This axiom re-
quires that we do not interpret the degree of risk aversion as being related
to a “marginal utility of income.”
Our second and main new axiom is reduction of risk aversion. It says
that the household is less risk averse than its members. The axiom requires
defining a comparative notion of risk aversion. Following Yaari (1969), we
say that a preference R1 is less risk averse than R2 if, for every constant act c
and every act x, when xR2 c then xR1 c. The idea is that if the risk involved
in choosing the risky act x over the certain act c is acceptable for R2, then
it must also be acceptable for R1.
The social welfare function guides the household’s decisions on how to
share risky prospects. In a classic paper discussing the representative con-
sumer problem in demand theory, Samuelson (1956) (see also Graaff (1957),
p. 49) shows that a household which allocates aggregate bundles optimally
according to some SWF behaves as if it is an individual (that is, it has a com-
plete and transitive preference). Our social welfare function generates such
a preference for each list of individual preferences–this is what we call the
household preference. Our main axiom requires that this household prefer-
ence be less risk averse than the preferences of each member of the household.
The assumption that a government or a firm behaves in a risk neutral
fashion is often justified on the grounds that large groups of agents will tend
to behave in a risk neutral fashion. It is understood that the second order
effects of risk can be mitigated by properly sharing risk. However, it is equally
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clear that not all methods of risk sharing will have this effect; for a simple
counterexample consider a dictatorship. Our requirement of reduction of
risk aversion is a simple fixed-population notion capturing the intuition that
societies should tend toward risk neutrality.
Alternatively, we know that in environments of inter-household bargain-
ing, the less risk averse a household, the more rewards a household will obtain.
Reduction of risk aversion then states that it is better for the household to
act collectively than to be represented by any single individual. Hence, it is
reminiscent of an “incentive compatibility” condition on SWF’s.
We characterize the family of SWF’s satisfying these axioms. The sum of
individual certainty equivalents represents the unique one which is quasicon-
cave over riskless allocations. That is, for each individual’s state-contingent
consumption, the rule finds the certain amount that the individual would
need to be given in compensation, then adds these across individuals.
More generally, we refer to the only rules which satisfy our axioms as
anyone can take all (ACTA) rules. These rules are characterized by a kind
of social utility function. The social utility has the property that for any
allocation, social utility is a function only of the certainty equivalents of
that allocation. Further, the rule is called an ACTA rule as for any riskless
amount, it is deemed socially optimal to give the entire amount to any one
of the individuals in the household.
1.1 Related literature
There is a vast literature on risk-sharing in economics. Seminal papers dis-
cussing optimal risk sharing include Borch (1962) and Wilson (1968) (see
also Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000)). Under the assumption that all
agents are subjective expected utility maximizers, they determine that, under
certain conditions (risk aversion or a continuum of states) all Pareto optimal
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allocations can be obtained by maximizing a weighted sum of subjective ex-
pected utilities.2 A central result of Wilson (1968) is that the risk tolerance
of household preference is the sum of risk tolerances of each individual at the
optimal household consumption.3
We present our results in a framework with general “non-expected util-
ity” preferences. We suppose that there is a fixed, exogenous prior governing
the realization of the states of nature. However; the assumption that pref-
erences are risk averse with respect to this prior is compatible with a host
of general decision theoretic models, including (but not limited to) Schmei-
dler (1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Machina and Schmeidler (1992),
Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rusti-
chini (2006), Siniscalchi (2007), Ergin and Gul (2008), Cerreia-Vioglio, Mac-
cheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2008), and Seo (2008).
Our work differs from previous studies concerning risk in that it is norma-
tive. Most previous studies seek to explain behavioral phenomena in markets,
for example see Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994), Epstein
(2001), Rigotti and Shannon (2005) and Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki
(2008). In contrast, we try to understand the SWF that satisfy normatively
appealing axioms. In that sense, the exercise is closer to Wilson (1968).
Section 2 provides the model; Section 3 has the main results; Section 4
2In particular, under these assumptions, Pareto optimal allocations satisfy what Gollier
(2001) terms the “mutuality” principle–consumption of each individual depends only on
the aggregate amount in each state. As the sum of certainty equivalents satisfies the
Pareto principle, any allocation it recommends is Pareto optimal and hence satisfies the
mutuality principle.
3Gollier (2001) builds on this result, showing that if all individuals have identical pref-
erences, then a weighted utilitarian planner who optimizes social welfare given a constraint
on average consumption results in a less risk-averse household preference if and only if the
individual risk tolerance is convex. It should be noted that this is a fixed-profile result:
the weighted utilitarian rules applied to arbitrary subjective expected utility profiles do
not typically reduce risk aversion.
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presents results for homothetic preferences, and examples of familiar special
cases. Section 5 provides discussion and related literature.
2 The model
Let Ω be a finite set of states of the world. The distribution of the states
is governed by an exogenous probability measure pi which has full support.
Acts are state-contingent elements of R+; that is, the set of acts is X = RΩ+.
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a finite set of agents. An allocation is an element of
XN . An allocation of x ∈ X is a vector x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ XN for which∑
i∈N xi = x.
Remark: Before going any further, we point out a common misconcep-
tion. Because we are working with a set of states of the world, instead of
taking as primitive choice objects a set of lotteries, many might under-
stand that we are working in a framework of ambiguity and uncertainty,
instead of risk. In fact, the reason we work with a set of states of the
world is that this is the right framework to discuss risk-sharing.
A preference relation R is a complete, transitive, continuous, and
monotonic4 binary relation on X satisfying (pi · x) R x for all x ∈ X.5 The
latter requirement is that R is risk averse.6 The set of preferences is denoted
R. A preference profile is a vector R = (R1, ..., Rn) ∈ RN . N -vectors are
written in boldface throughout.
4That is, if x (ω) > y (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, then x is strictly better than y for R (xRy and
not y R x).
5We here abuse notation in a standard way by identifying the constant act which takes
value c in every state with c itself.
6This is a relatively weak notion; one might also ask that the preference is averse to
mean-preserving spreads; but this adds nothing to our analysis.
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Our aim in this study is to understand methods of aggregating prefer-
ences which reduce risk aversion. We imagine a set of agents who reside
in a household and use some social welfare function to optimally distribute
resources. Samuelson (1956) observed that such optimization leads to “ra-
tional” behavior in the aggregate. We ask when such household behavior is
less risk averse than the behavior of each individual in the household.
To this end, we discuss a comparative notion of risk aversion. For c ∈ R+,
we abuse notation and identify c with the constant act whose outcome in
every state is c. Let R′ and R be two preference relations. As in Yaari (1969),
we say that R is more risk averse than R′ if for all c ≥ 0, {x : x R c} ⊆
{x : x R′ c}. Every uncertain prospect which is preferred to c by R is also
preferred to c by R′.7
A domain D is a nonempty subset of RN . A social welfare function
is a mapping which carries D into binary relations over XN , the space of
allocations. Formally, we denote the set of binary relations over XN by RN .
Then a social welfare function is a function0: D → RN . We write0(R)
for the binary relation over allocations obtained when individual preferences
are R = (Ri)i∈N .
Example 1: A classical domain of preferences is the domain of risk averse
expected utility profiles. We denote this domain by EU . Formally, R ∈ EU if
for all i ∈ N , there exists ui : R+ → R which is strictly increasing, concave,
and continuous for which for all i ∈ N and all x, y ∈ X, x Ri y if and only if∑
ω∈Ω
pi (ω)ui (x (ω)) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
pi (ω)ui (y (ω)) .
7Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) provide modern adaptations of
this comparative notion to general settings of Knightian uncertainty. Their definitions
differ as to the benchmark of “uncertainty neutral” acts, but coincide with Yaari’s when
uncertainty neutral acts are taken to be the constant acts.
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A standard example of a social welfare function 0: EU → RN used in
the theory of risk sharing (for example, Borch (1962) and Wilson (1968))
is the utilitarian rule. For any R ∈ EU , there exists for all i ∈ N a
unique uRi : R+ → R which represents Ri and which is normalized so that
uRi (0) = 0 and uRi (1) = 1. We then require x 0 (R) y if and only if∑
i∈N
∑
ω∈Ω
pi (ω)uRi (xi (ω)) ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
ω∈Ω
pi (ω)uRi (yi (ω)) .
Note that, while we have restricted elements of R significantly, elements
of RN obey no restrictions whatsoever (we will later make assumptions on
these elements in the form of axioms). This is because elements of R are
understood to be descriptive, whereas elements of RN are normative recom-
mendations for a society.
3 Results
We proceed to describe the four axioms. The axioms will be equivalent to
a certain class of SWF’s. Coupled with quasiconcavity over riskless alloca-
tions, we characterize the SWF which is represented as the sum of certainty
equivalents.
Our first axiom states that household preferences over allocations should
be minimally “rational.”
Rationality: For all R ∈ D, 0(R) is continuous, complete, and tran-
sitive.
Our second axiom is natural and requires that the SWF comply with the
(weak) Pareto property.
Pareto: For all R ∈ D and all x,y ∈ XN , if xiRi yi for all i ∈ N , then
x0(R) y (with strict preference if all individual preferences are strict).
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Our next axiom is the first that deals specifically with the interpretation
of risk. It requires that in ranking profiles of certain (risk-free) prospects, the
social welfare function should ignore risk attitudes. A constant act c ∈ X
is an act which takes only one value. A constant allocation is an allocation
of constant acts. Acts are monetary payoffs, and individual preferences are
monotonic, so all individual preferences coincide over constant acts: more is
better. The independence axiom says that, when comparing constant alloca-
tions, 0 should not depend on individual risk preferences. These preferences
do not differ in the comparison of constant acts anyhow.
Independence of risk attitudes for constant acts: For all
R,R′ ∈ D and all constant c,d ∈ XN , c0(R) d⇐⇒ c0(R′) d.
We often refer to the axiom simply as independence. Mathematically,
together with the Pareto property, the axiom allows us to work with a rank-
ing over vectors of certainty equivalents (defined below). This ranking over
vectors of certainty equivalents is independent of the preference profile in
question.
Remark: It is often the case for expected utility preferences that the
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index is somehow understood as a
“cardinal” measure of preference. It is true that the concavity of this
index relates to risk aversion and comparative risk aversion. However,
it is incorrect to infer that this cardinal structure has any meaning when
making ethical comparisons across agents. For example, there are no
decision theoretic grounds for interpreting the curvature of the utility in-
dex as being related to marginal utility of income.8 We argue here that
it is reasonable to ignore risk attitudes altogether when ranking constant
prospects: when one decides on a “fair” way to split a certain dollar, it
is rare that a discussion of attitudes toward risk would come into play.
8Marginal utilities would have to be elicited by a utility differences model.
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For a preference R ∈ R, the certainty equivalent ceR : X → R is
defined by
ceR (x) = inf {c : c R x} .
It is the value of the unique constant act which is indifferent to x; that is, by
monotonicity and continuity, ceR (x) I x.
9 Critically for us, for a given R,
ceR : X → R is a continuous utility representation of R.
For an allocation x ∈ XN and preference profile R ∈ RN , ceR (x) =
(ceR1 (x1) , ..., ceRn (x)).
Remark: For two preferences R,R′ ∈ R, R is more risk averse than R′
if and only if for all x ∈ X, ceR (x) ≤ ceR′ (x).
Proposition 2: A social welfare function on D satisfies rationality,
Pareto, and independence if and only if there exists a strictly mono-
tonic and continuous function W : RN+ → R for which for all R ∈ D
and all x,y ∈ XN ,
x0(R) y⇐⇒ W (ceR (x)) ≥ W (ceR (y)) .10
Proof: Let R′ ∈ D. Define W : RN → R so that W (d) ≥ W (c) if and
only if
d0(R′) c.
Such a W exists as 0 (R′) is continuous (Debreu, 1964). W is strictly
monotonic by the Pareto property. Now, let R ∈ D be arbitrary. Let
x,y ∈ XN . Then by Pareto and rationality, x 0(R) y if and only if
9We write x I y for x R y and y R x.
10We say a function W : RN+ → R is strictly monotonic if x,y ∈ RN+ and x ≥ y implies
W (x) ≥W (y), and x y (xi > yi for all i ∈ N) implies W (x) > W (y).
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ceR (x)0(R) ceR (y). By independence ceR (x)0(R) ceR (y) if and only
if ceR (x)0(R′) ceR (y). By definition of W , ceR (x)0(R′) ceR (y) if and
only if W (ceR (x)) ≥ W (ceR (y)). 
To understand our fourth and last axiom, we need to discuss the notion
of risk sharing. It is the standard notion of risk sharing, in an environment of
possibly non-expected-utility maximizers (see e.g. Epstein (2001) and Rigotti
and Shannon (2005)).
The individuals in N are all members of a household. Household mem-
bers entertain different attitudes toward risk. We imagine that the house-
hold uses a SWF to allocate an aggregate bundle x among its members.
That is, given individual preferences R, they maximize 0 (R) across{
x ∈ XN : ∑i∈N xi ≤ x}. Under our continuity assumptions, this risk-
sharing maximization problem is well-defined. Risk sharing generates a well-
defined household preference over acts: a “household preference.” This ag-
gregation results from a well-known aggregation result in classical demand
theory (see Samuelson (1956) and Chipman and Moore (1979)).
The aggregate household preferences are derived from 0(R): Household
preferences over acts are given by xh(R)y if and only if for all y ∈ XN such
that
∑
i∈N yi ≤ y, there exists x ∈ XN such that
∑
i∈N xi ≤ x and x0(R)y.
This binary relation is the household preference. In particular, xh(R)y
whenever the maximal allocation of x according to 0 (R) is better than
every allocation of y.
We are now ready to state our next axiom.
Reduction of risk aversion: For all R ∈ D, h(R) is less risk averse
than Ri for all i ∈ N .
Reduction of risk aversion is a way of capturing, in a fixed population
framework, the notion that households of individuals should tend to be risk
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neutral. It also makes sense as a strategic property: in inter-household bar-
gaining, the incentive will usually exist to be as risk neutral as possible. For
example, the Nash bargaining solution tends to give more to less risk averse
households: see Kihlstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler (1981); Rubinstein, Safra,
and Thomson (1992).
Remark: Reduction of risk aversion is much stronger than the require-
ment that the household preference be locally less risk averse than each
individual agent at optimal consumption. Indeed, the requirement of less
local risk aversion would be satisfied for essentially any social welfare
function satisfying the Pareto property.
Example 3: Suppose D = EU and consider the utilitarian rule defined in
Example 1. In general, for any R ∈ EU , the household preference h(R) is
expected utility with von Neumann Morgenstern utility index given by
u (x) = supP
i∈N xi=x
∑
i∈N
uRi (xi) .
The function u is referred to as the “sup-convolution” of the functions uRi .
It is easily verified that the resulting h need not have any relation to the
individual preferences in terms of attitudes toward risk.
Figure 1 presents the problem geometrically. One preference R1 is less
risk averse than R2 if, when we compare their upper contour sets through
any riskless act, the upper contour set of R1 contains that of R2. Figure 1(a)
illustrates how the preferences having the U¯1− U¯1 indifference curve are less
risk averse than those having the U¯2−U¯2 curve. The tangent line in the figure
indicates the prior pi. In Figure 1(a), any household preference satisfying the
reduction of risk aversion axiom will need to have indifference curves “below”
U¯1 − U¯1.
Figure 1(b) presents a case where the preferences do not have comparable
risk aversion. In the figure, the most risk averse household preference which
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x(1)
U¯2
U¯1
x(2)
U¯2
(a) Preference R1 is less risk averse
than R2.
U¯1
U¯2
U¯2
x(1)
U¯1
x(2)
(b) Household preference must
contain lower envelope of U¯1 − U¯1
and U¯2 − U¯2.
Figure 1: Comparisons in risk aversion.
is less risk averse than each individual agent is given by the lower envelope of
the two indifference curves (i.e. by the curve which goes from U¯1 to the inter-
section of the two indifference curves, then coincides with U¯2 − U¯2 until the
second intersection, then coincides with U¯1 − U¯1). Note that this household
preference is not convex, and any household preference satisfying reduction
of risk aversion must have indifference curves below this lower envelope of
U¯1 − U¯1 and U¯2 − U¯2.
Our aim from this point on is to characterize those functions W which
reduce risk aversion.
Example 4: One of the simplest examples of a W which reduces risk aver-
sion is given by
W (d1, ..., dn) = max
i∈N
{di} .
This function illustrates some of the properties of the reduction of risk
aversion. The household rule generated by this function reduces risk aversion,
but the function W constitutes a very unfair rule. Moreover, the induced
household preferences are typically not convex, even when the individual
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preferences are convex. If we denote by Ui (c) the upper contour set of Ri
at c, then it is easily verified that U∗ (c) =
⋃
i∈N
Ui (c) (this also verifies that
this household preference is the most risk averse preference which is less risk
averse than each individual preference in the household).
The following simple proposition illustrates that the household preference
is risk averse. The intuition for the result is similar to results appearing in
Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000), Dana (2002) and Rigotti,
Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008).
Proposition 5: Suppose that 0 satisfies Pareto. Then for all x ∈ X,
(pi · x)h(R) x.
Proof: Let x ∈ X and let x ∈ XN such that ∑i∈N xi = x. Then, for
all i ∈ N , (pi · xi) Ri xi. Clearly,
∑
i∈N pi · xi = pi ·
∑
i∈N xi = pi · x. By
Pareto, (pi · x1, ..., pi · xn) 0 (R) x. Consequently, by definition of h (R),
pi · x h (R)x. 
The following result is our main characterization theorem. It tells us that
under our axioms, a social welfare function reduces risk aversion if and only
if it is associated with a function W which is maximized on any c-simplex at
the vertices. This property of W means that in allocating a constant act, all
allocations which give one agent all consumption are socially optimal.
For c ∈ R+, the c-simplex ∆c =
{
d ∈ RN+ :
∑
i∈N di = c
}
is the set of
nonnegative vectors summing to c.
Formally, define an anyone can take all (ACTA) rule as a SWF for
which there exists some strictly monotonic, continuous W : RN+ → R for
which for all c ∈ R+, for all i ∈ N ,
(ci, 0−i) ∈ arg max
d∈∆c
W (d)
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such that for all x,y ∈ XN and all R ∈ RN , x 0 (R) y if and only
if W (ceR (x)) ≥ W (ceR (y)).11 The terminology ACTA refers to the fact
that, for any riskless amount c, an ACTA rule finds it optimal to distribute all
of c to some individual in the household–but the rule is completely indifferent
as to which individual is to receive c.
Examples of W functions generating ACTA rules are the max function
and the sum (utilitarian) function as discussed in Examples 1 and 4. Other
examples include the functions W (u) =
(∑
i∈N u
p
i
)1/p
for p ≥ 1.
Remark: Because the ACTA rules recommend that giving everything to
one individual is optimal in situations with no risk, one might confuse
them with dictatorial rules, and hence view our following characteriza-
tion as an impossibility. This is not correct for two reasons. For one,
the fact that giving everything to one individual is optimal does not pre-
clude the optimality of equal division, or any other division of resources.
Secondly, nearly any social welfare existing in the literature which is not
of the maxmin form will recommend giving everything to one agent in
some situations. Simply because the situations in which ACTA rules
make such recommendations are situations involving no risk does not
mean we have an impossibility result.
The theorem holds on very general domains; however, in the statement of
our theorem, we require that the domain include all expected utility profiles.
A close inspection of the proof establishes that we only need to assume that
our domain includes, for every individual, a profile for which that individual
is risk neutral, and all remaining individuals have expected utility preferences
whose utility index satisfies the Inada conditions.
11The notation (ci, 0−i) refers to the element of XN whose ith coordinate is c, and all
remaining coordinates are 0.
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(t1, t2) : W (t1, t2) = W¯
¯
Figure 2: Level curves of W in the hypotheses of Theorem 6.
Theorem 6: Suppose that EU ⊆ D. A social welfare function satisfies
rationality, Pareto, independence, and reduction of risk aversion on D
if and only if it is an ACTA rule.
Figure 2 shows the level curves of a W corresponding to an ACTA rule.
It should be clear that requiring W to be quasiconcave pins down the sum
of certainty equivalents. The following axiom contains the quasiconcavity
restriction. It has the interpretation that in an “divide the dollar” environ-
ment, without risk, social preferences should be “fair.”
Quasiconcavity: Let c and d be constant allocations. Let R ∈ RN .
Suppose c 0 (R) d. Then for all α ∈ [0, 1], αc + (1− α) d 0 (R) d.
Corollary 7: Suppose that EU ⊆ D. A social welfare function 0 sat-
isfies rationality, Pareto, independence, reduction of risk aversion, and
quasiconcavity if and only if for all R ∈ D and all x,y ∈ XN ,
x 0 (R) y⇐⇒
∑
i∈N
ceRi (xi) ≥
∑
i∈N
ceRi (yi) .
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Figure 3: Some intuition for Theorem 6.
Corollary 7 tells us that the only “fair” SWF to reduce risk aversion is
the one which ranks allocations according to the sum of its certainty equiv-
alents. When allocating a constant act by the sum of certainty equivalents,
all constant allocations are socially optimal.
A simple incomplete intuition for the proof of Theorem 6 exists. Any
aggregate bundle generates a utility possibility set, where utilities are given
by certainty equivalents. The definition of our household preference suggests
that for any profile of individual preferences, to rank aggregate bundles, we
rank utility possibility sets by their best element according to some function
W–see Proposition 2. The Pareto and independence conditions are used to
guarantee that this same social welfare function W is used for all profiles of
individual preferences.
Now consider a constant aggregate bundle c. For the certainty equivalent
representation, the utility possibility set of c is a simplex. We represent the
situation in Figure 3; the utility possibility set of c is represented as UPS1
in blue. Suppose there is now another bundle x which some individual i (in
the figure individual 1) prefers to the constant bundle. This means that the
utility possibility set for bundle x, UPS2, extends beyond the simplex on i’s
axis. By the reduction in risk aversion axiom, since 1 prefers x over c, so must
the household. In fact, even if we choose the remaining individuals’ utility
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functions so that they get very little utility from x, the household should
still prefer x to c. This means that there is some list of individual utilities
corresponding to some allocation of x which lies outside of the simplex, and
which is ranked higher than every element of the simplex by W . Because the
only list of individual utilities lying outside of the simplex are ones in which
individual i gets “almost all” of the utility, it seems reasonable to conclude
that W corresponds to an ACTA rule.
Our formal proof does not follow this construction, and instead uses a
“dual” representation, based on demand functions.
We end the section with a formal proof of Theorem 6.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 6): First, suppose there exists a W as in the
statement of the theorem. We shall prove that it satisfies the reduction of
risk aversion axiom. That it satisfies the remaining axioms is immediate.
Let R ∈ D. Let c be a constant act. We wish to show that for all i ∈ N ,
{x : x Ri c} ⊆
{
x : xh(R) c}.
As a first step, we show that for all i ∈ N , (c, 0−i) ∈
arg maxx∈AcW (ceR (x)), where Ac is the set of allocations of the constant
act c. That is, Ac =
{
y ∈ XN : ∑i∈N yi = c}.
Let y ∈ Ac. For all i ∈ N , (pi · yi) Ri yi, and (pi · y1, ..., pi · yn) ∈ ∆c. So,
for any y ∈ Ac there is d ∈ ∆c such that W (d) ≥ W (ceR(x)). Continuity of
W and compactness of ∆c implies there exists an optimal allocation for W
in ∆c. There therefore exists a constant allocation d
∗ ∈ arg maxx∈AcW (x);
d∗ ∈ ∆c. By the hypothesis on W , W (c, 0−i) ≥ W (d∗); we therefore establish
that (c, 0−i) ∈ arg maxAcW .
Now, let x ∈ X and suppose that x Ri c. So ceRi(x) ≥ c. Then for all
y ∈ XN for which ∑i∈N yi = c,
W (ceRi (x) , 0−i) ≥ W (c, 0−i) ≥ W (y1, . . . , yn) .
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Therefore, for every allocation y of c, (x, 0−i) 0(R) y. By definition of
h(R), xh(R) c.
Conversely, suppose that 0 satisfies the axioms. W exists from Propo-
sition 2; we will show that the vertices of every simplex maximize W on the
simplex.
Define ∆++ (Ω) =
{
q ∈ RΩ++ :
∑
ω q (ω) = 1
}
(the set of full support prob-
ability measures). We shall consider a profile R ∈ EU . Fix an arbitrary
j ∈ N . Let Rj be defined by
ceRj (x) = pi · x
and for all i 6= j, choose some strictly increasing, concave, and differentiable
ui : R+ → R for which limx→0+ u′i (x) = +∞ and limx→+∞ u′i (x) = 0 (the
Inada conditions) and define Ri by
xRiy ⇐⇒
∑
ω
pi (ω)ui (x (ω)) ≥
∑
ω
pi (ω)ui (y (ω)) .
Note that R ∈ EU . Importantly for what follows, each Ri is a convex pref-
erence relation.
By Proposition 5, h(R) is risk averse. We shall prove that, by reduction
of risk aversion, h(R) = Rj. To see this, let c ∈ X be a constant act. Then
as h(R) is risk averse, if xh(R) c, then pi · x ≥ c; consequently x Rj c by
the definition of Rj. Hence,
{
x : xh(R) c} ⊆ {x : x Rj c}. By reduction
of risk aversion, we obtain that {x : xRjc} =
{
x : xh(R) c}. This implies
that ceRj = ceh(R); thus Rj = h(R).
For each i ∈ N , define the indirect utility function vRi : ∆++ (Ω)×R+
by
vRi (q,m) = max
q·x≤m
ceRi (x) .
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Define Uh(R) : X → R by
Uh(R) (x) = supP
xi=x
W (ceR (x)) .
Similarly, define the household indirect utility function by
Vh(R) (q,m) = max
q·x≤m
Uh(R) (x) .
By Chipman and Moore (1979), Theorem 3.9,
Vh(R) (q,m) = max
d∈∆(N)
W
(
(vRi (q, dim))i∈N
)
.
By the Maximum Theorem, the correspondence δ : ∆ (Ω)× R+ defined by
δ (q,m) = arg max
d∈∆(N)
W
(
(vRi (q, dim))i∈N
)
is well-defined and upper semi-continuous. Define the demand corre-
spondence xR (q,m) as those allocations which are R-maximal in the set
{x : q · x ≤ m}.
By Chipman and Moore (1979), Corollary 3.5,
xh(R) (q,m) =
⋃
d∈δ(q,m)
∑
i∈N
xRi (q, dim) .
Now, let q ∈ ∆++ (Ω),q 6= pi,q  0. Since h(R) coincides with Rj, if
x ∈ xh(R) (q,m), then if q(ω)pi(ω) > q(ω
′)
pi(ω′) , x (ω) = 0. Therefore, there exists
ω for which x (ω) = 0. Moreover, for all i 6= j, if m > 0, xRi (q,m)  0.
Consequently, we conclude that for all d ∈ δ (q,m), di = 0 for i 6= j. By
upper semicontinuity of δ, conclude that (1j, 0−j) ∈ δ (pi,m).
Note that for all i ∈ N and all d ∈ ∆(N), vRi (pi, dim) = dim (as vRi was
defined using the certainty equivalent utility representation of Ri). Conse-
quently (vRi (pi, dim))i∈N ∈ ∆m; and for any u ∈ ∆m, there exists d ∈ ∆(N)
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for which (vRi (pi, dim))i∈N = u. As (1j, 0−j) ∈ δ (q,m), we therefore conclude
by definition of δ that W (mj, 0−j) ≥ W (u), for all u ∈ ∆m.
As j and m were arbitrary, the proof is complete. 
4 Application: homothetic preferences
Theorem 6 gives a family of functions that reduce risk aversion. We singled
out the sum of certainty equivalents based on quasiconcavity. Here we provide
another justification, one that holds for profiles of homothetic preferences.
The maximum function in Example 4 is the most risk averse preference
which is less risk averse than all individual preferences. As we remarked, this
rule may in general induce non-convex household preferences even when all
individual preferences are convex: see Figure 1(b).
Here we study the most risk averse convex preference which is less risk
averse than all individual preferences for convex individual preferences. We
show that, for profiles of convex and homothetic preferences, the sum of
certainty equivalents gives the most risk averse convex preference that is less
risk averse than members’ preferences.
In Figure 1(b), the most risk averse convex household preference relation
is given by the convex hull of the two upper contour sets. If we denote the
upper contour set of agent i’s preference at c as Ui (c), the upper contour set
of the household preference at c is
co
⋃
i∈N
Ui (c),
the closed convex hull of the union of the individual upper contour sets. We
shall prove this below.
Say a preference R ∈ R is homothetic if for all x, y ∈ X and all α > 0,
xR y =⇒ (αx)R (αy). Denote the set of homothetic and convex preferences
by H.
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Theorem 8: Suppose that R ∈ HN∩R. Consider the SWF represented
by the sum of certainty equivalents. Then the household preference h
(R) is homothetic, and is the most risk averse convex preference which
is less risk averse than Ri for all i ∈ N .
The theorem demonstrates that at any constant act, the upper contour
set of the household preference is the closed convex hull of the union of the
individual upper contour sets. This means that the household preference gen-
erated by the sum of certainty equivalents is both tractable and geometrically
simple.12
The proof of Theorem 8 exploits the fact that every profile of com-
mon prior homothetic preferences has, for each agent, a representation as:
ceRi (x) = infy∈Ci x · y, where the common prior pi minimizes
∑
ω∈Ω y (ω) in
Ci. In particular, this set Ci can be explicitly calculated as
Ci = {y : x Ri 1 =⇒ x · y ≥i 1} .
Using this representation, it is easy to explicitly calculate household pref-
erence: it is given by Uh(R) (x) = inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
x · y, verifying the tractability
of the sum of individual certainty equivalents as an instrument of applied
analysis.
Example 9: “Multiple priors”: Suppose that for all i ∈ N , there exists some
Πi for which pi ∈ Πi; and that for all i ∈ N , ceRi (x) = minpi∗∈Πi⊆∆(Ω) pi∗ · x.
Then xh(R) y ⇐⇒ min
pi∗∈
⋂
Πi+RΩ+
pi∗ · x ≥ min
pi∗∈
⋂
Πi+RΩ+
pi∗ · y.13
12There is a similar result in the theory of international trade, on the maximization of
profits under constant returns to scale and more than one industry. Lerner (1934) and
Chipman (1966) present a “diagrammatic” argument.
13For two sets A and B, A + B = {x + y : x ∈ A, y ∈ B}.
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Example 10: CRRA expected utility maximizers: Suppose that for all i ∈
N , ceRi (x) =
(∫
Ω
[x (ω)]ρi dpi (ω)
) 1
ρi for ρi ∈ [0, 1]. Then
xh(R)y ⇐⇒
(∫
Ω
[x (ω)]maxi∈N ρi dpi (ω)
)1/maxi∈N ρi
≥
(∫
Ω
[y (ω)]maxi∈N ρi dpi (ω)
)1/maxi∈N ρi
.
We end this section with a proof of Theorem 8
Proof (Proof of Theorem 8): The following two lemmas are well-
known, but we reproduce them here for completeness.
Lemma 11: If R ∈ H, then the function ceR : X → R is a utility
representation for R which is homogeneous of degree one.
Proof: Recall
ceR (x) = inf {c : c R x} .
To see that the certainty equivalent is homogeneous, let x ∈ X and α > 0.
Then
ceR (αx) = inf {αc : αc R αx}
= α inf {c : αc R αx}
= α inf {c : c R x}
= αceR (x) ,
where the second to last equality holds by homotheticity. 
Lemma 12: If u is monotone, homogeneous of degree one, and quasi-
concave, then it is concave.
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Proof: Let x, y ∈ X and α ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose without loss of generality that
u (y) ≥ u (x). If u (x) = 0, then by monotonicity,
u (αx+ (1− α) y) ≥ u ((1− α) y)
= (1− α)u (y) = αu (x) + (1− α)u (y) ,
verifying concavity. Otherwise, suppose u (x) > 0. Then
αu (x) + (1− α)u (y)
=
[(
α
α + (1− α) u(y)
u(x)
)
u (x) +
(1− α) u(y)
u(x)
α + (1− α) u(y)
u(x)
u
(
u (x)
u (y)
y
)]
×
[
α + (1− α) u (y)
u (x)
]
.
Note now that u (x) = u(x)
u(y)
u (y) = u
(
u(x)
u(y)
y
)
, so that by quasiconcavity,
≤ u (x)
[
α + (1− α) u (y)
u (x)
]
= αu (x) + (1− α)u (y) ,
verifying concavity. 
Let R ∈ HN∩R. By Lemmas 11 and 12, the certainty equivalent function
ceRi : X → R is homogeneous and concave. Moreover, for all constant acts
c, ceRi (c) = c. Extend ceRi to all of RΩ by defining
ce′Ri (x) =
{
ceRi (x) if x ≥ 0
−∞ otherwise .
The function ce′Ri is concave, monotonic, and upper semicontinuous. Its
conjugate,
(
ce′Ri
)∗
: RN → R is defined by(
ce′Ri
)∗
(x) = inf
y∈RΩ
x · y − ce′Ri (y) .
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It is well-known that this function is itself concave and that there is a
nonempty, closed, convex, upper comprehensive14 set Ci ⊆ RN+ for which
(
ce′Ri
)∗
(x) =
{
0 if x ∈ Ci
−∞ otherwise.
}
.
Moreover,
ce′Ri (x) = infy∈Ci
x · y.
(See, Rockafellar (1970) Theorem 12.2, Theorem 13.2 and Corollary 13.2.1).
We claim that pi ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci and moreover that pi lies on the boundary (has
minimal sum) of each Ci. To see this, note that for each i and each constant
act c, ce′Ri (c) = c, so 1 = ce
′
Ri
(1) = infy∈Ci 1 · y = infy∈Ci
∑
ω y(ω). Now,
suppose that pi /∈ Ci for some Ci. In particular, by a standard separation
argument, there exists x ∈ RN+\ {0} for which pi · x < infy∈Ci y · x. Let c be
a real number for which pi · x < c < infy∈Ci y · x = ceRi(x). But then x Ri c,
while pi · x < c, contradicting the fact that Ri is risk averse.
Now consider the function defined on X for which
Uh(R) (x) = maxP
xi=x
∑
ceRi (xi) .
Clearly, this function can also be defined on all of RΩ, so that
U ′h(R) (x) = maxP
xi=x
∑
ce′Ri (xi) .
Moreover, it is easy to see, that since U ′h(R) takes infinite values outside of
X, for x ∈ X,
Uh(R) (x) = U
′
h(R) (x) .
14That is, if x ∈ C and y ≥ x, then y ∈ C.
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Finally, as U ′h(R) is the sup-convolution of the functions
(
ce′Ri
)
i∈N , we con-
clude that the conjugate(
U ′h(R)
)∗
(x) = inf
y∈RN
x · y − U ′h(R) (y)
is given by (
U ′h(R)
)∗
(x) =
∑
i∈N
(
ce′Ri (x)
)∗
=
 0 if x ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
−∞ otherwise.
 .
See Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 16.4 and Corollary 16.4.1. Consequently,
U ′h(R) (x) = inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
x · y.
Importantly for these arguments,
⋂
i∈N
Ci 6= ∅, as each Ci is upper comprehen-
sive and contains pi. Hence, we conclude that household preference h(R) is
represented by
xh(R) z ⇐⇒ inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
x · y ≥ inf
y∈
⋂
N
Ci
z · y,
where for all i ∈ N ,
x Ri z ⇐⇒ inf
y∈Ci
x · y ≥ inf
y∈Ci
z · y.
Clearly, then, h(R) is homothetic. To see that it is the most risk averse
convex preference which is less risk averse than each individual preference,
let c be a constant act. Note that pi ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci and also lies on the boundary
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of
⋂
i∈N
Ci (it minimizes
∑
y (ω) across y ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci). Consequently for any
constant act c,
c = c
∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω)
= c inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
∑
ω∈Ω
y(ω)
= inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
c · y
We will show that for any c,{
x : xh(R) c} = co ⋃
i∈N
{x : x Ri c},
which will verify the result. So first, we show that for all i ∈ N , {x : x Ri c} ⊆{
x : x h (R) c}. Note that xRi c implies that for all y ∈ Ci, x · y ≥ c which
implies that for all y ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci, x · y ≥ c, which implies that x h (R) c. We
therefore know that
co
⋃
i∈N
{x : x Ri c} ⊆
{
x : xh(R) c}
as h(R) is upper semicontinuous and convex. Suppose now that there
exists w ∈ X such that w h (R) c, and for which w /∈ co
⋃
i∈N
{x : x Ri c}. In
particular, by a standard separation argument, there exists y for which, when
normalized, y ·w < c ≤ y ·x for all i and all xRic. We claim that for all i ∈ N ,
y ∈ Ci; otherwise, there would exist a separating vector (again nonnegative
and normalized) z for which y · z < c < infy′∈Ci y′ · z. But then z Ri c and
y · z < c, contradicting y · x ≥ c for all x Ri c. Consequently, y ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci.
Therefore, inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
y · w < c, so that c h (R)w, a contradiction. 
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5 Discussion
5.1 Conclusion
We study household preferences in the context of sharing risk and uncer-
tainty. We are especially interested in the sum of certainty equivalents as
a criterion for choosing and allocating risky bundles. We identify a crucial
property behind this criterion: that aggregate preferences are less risk averse
than the members’ individual preferences.
Arguments for reduction in risk aversion are familiar in economics, and
appear as early as in Samuelson (1964), Vickrey (1964) and Arrow and Lind
(1970). These arguments are normative: a collective should behave in a less
risk averse way. The arguments roughly say that less cautious collectives
may reap the benefits of larger expected gains, and mitigate the risks by
risk sharing. The idea that a household should be less risk averse is also
strategically motivated. For example, often in strategic interactions, all else
equal, an agent who is less risk averse will fare better according to all prefer-
ences. This is the case in Nash bargaining (Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson
(1992)), as well as in many other game theoretic models of bargaining. So, by
appropriately sharing risk, a household seeks to become more “competitive.”
Our result says much more than that ACTA rules yield a local reduction in
risk aversion. The local statement would be that the household is locally less
risk averse than each individual at each individual’s optimal consumption.
Indeed, this would be true for any rule satisfying the Pareto property. Our
result is much stronger: ACTA rules generate a household which is less risk
averse than each of its members at every level of consumption.
We introduce two additional axioms: the Pareto criterion and that certain
(sure) acts should be compared without regard for risk preferences. From the
normative perspective, the Pareto criterion is obviously desirable, and the in-
dependence axiom should be appealing. Independence may not be appealing
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in a descriptive setting, in which any one agent can force a “breakdown” of
negotiations; then risk attitudes play a role even when the “optimal” choices
feature no risk (Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992) explain how attitudes
toward risk are important in a Nash bargaining context).
We characterize the household SWF’s which respect the Pareto criterion,
compare certain acts without regard for risk preferences, and which reduce
risk aversion. The results single out the sum of certainty equivalents as the
unique member of this class which is quasiconcave over certain allocations.
Quasiconcavity, in turn, is a basic fairness requirement.15
Our results hold when we restrict the domain to expected utility pref-
erences. this should be clear from the statements and proofs in Section 3.
The results are also novel as results about EU ; but no additional insights or
simplifications are gained from presenting them as results about EU . We em-
phasize; however, that our proof require that any domain include all expected
utility preferences.16
Our paper thus provides a justification for using the sum of certainty
equivalents as a guide in allocating risky prospects. The existing justifica-
tion (Myerson, 2004) says that any allocation which does not maximize the
sum of certainty equivalents could be improved upon by an allocation that
each individual agent would be willing to accept more for. This is a simple
consequence of interpreting certainty equivalents as willingness to accept.
Our justification is entirely different, and depends on the desirability of the
15Gorman (1959) argues that actual collectives may use a convex W : he believes that
utility profiles that are not very unequal may be inherently stable. Any small advantage
obtained by a group of agents will result in a political advantage, which will then reinforce
the initially small advantage. The resulting collective will behave as if it used a convex
social choice function.
16Actually, a close reading of our proof indicates that we only require that the domain
include all risk neutral preferences, and at least one expected utility preference satisfying
the Inada conditions.
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collective being less risk averse than household members.
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